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Abstract 
 
The relationship between Chairs and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been 
largely neglected in research on nonprofit governance. Yet a growing body of 
research on corporate governance in the private and public sectors suggests that this 
relationship is crucial both to the effective functioning of the board and the leadership 
of the organization. Much of the research on chair-CEO relationships has employed 
cross-sectional research designs ignoring the fact that these relationships will evolve 
over time. This paper responds to some of these challenges. It presents the results 
from longitudinal research examining the relationship between the chair and chief 
executive in a nonprofit organization. It shows how this relationship is ‘negotiated’ 
and develops over time in response to contextual changes. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between Chairs and Chief Executives (CEOs) has been largely 
neglected in research on nonprofit governance. Yet a small but growing body of 
research on corporate governance in the private and public sectors suggests that this 
relationship is crucial both to the effective functioning of the board and the leadership 
of the organization (e.g. Stewart, 1991; Roberts and Stiles, 1999; Robinson and 
Exworthy, 1999; Kakabadse et al, 2010). Much of the research on chair-CEO 
relationships has employed cross-sectional research designs. However, as Shen (2003) 
notes the relationship between boards (and hence also chairs) and CEOs is a dynamic 
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one and will evolve as it develops. As a result he calls for longitudinal research to 
examine the board-CEO relationship. More generally Cornforth (2012) has argued 
that research on nonprofit governance needs to pay much greater attention to 
processes of change and how these are influenced by contextual and historical factors. 
Similarly, ’t Hart (2014) suggests that more research is required on the dynamic nexus 
between context and leadership. 
 
This paper responds to these challenges. It presents the results from research 
examining the relationship between the chair and CEO, and how this relationship is 
‘negotiated’ and develops over time in response to both contextual and situational 
changes. The research involved a longitudinal case study of a small nonprofit 
organization in the UK carried out over a 3.5 year period beginning in early 2010.  
Research on the governance of small nonprofit organizations has been rather 
neglected in the literature and this research also reflects on the particular governance 
challenges they face. 
 
As Roberts and Stiles (1999: 38) note the roles and relationship between chairs and 
CEOs cannot be understood simply in terms of formal job and role descriptions. The 
boundaries between the roles are often unclear and change as they develop and in 
response to changing circumstances.  A conceptual framework derived from 
negotiated order theory (Strauss, 1978) was chosen to analyse the case study data 
because it emphasises the recursive relationship between contextual factors and social 
interactions through which social relationships are negotiated (Dokko et al., 2012: 
686)  
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The article is structured as follows. The next section analyses the relevant literature on 
chair – CEO relationships. This is followed by a discussion of the analytical 
framework, based on negotiated order theory, which was used to analyse how chair-
CEO relationships develop. The methodology for the research is then discussed. This 
is followed by a presentation of the empirical findings from the case study. Finally, 
the conclusions from the research are discussed. 
 
The Chair – Chief Executive Relationship 
 
There has been relatively little empirical research on the relationship between chairs 
and CEOs in the nonprofit sector. Research has tended to focus more broadly on the 
relationship between boards and executives/staff. Ostrower and Stone (2006) suggest 
that much of the early prescriptive literature characterised the relationship between 
boards and staff as a partnership of equals, and that any problems between the board 
and staff could be resolved by clarifying their respective roles. Empirical research has 
challenged this view. The parties may have unequal power, the relationship may 
involve tensions and conflict, and change over time with changing circumstances 
(Kramer, 1985; Golensky, 1993). Wood (1992) suggests the relationship may follow a 
cyclical path with changes being triggered by organizational crises.  Similarly, 
Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) and Reid and Turbide (2014) highlight how 
organisational crises can trigger a loss of trust between boards and CEOs, and a shift 
in power relations. 
 
Murray et al (1992) observed five broad patterns of power relations in a sample of 
Canadian nonprofits: the CEO-dominated board; the chair-dominated board; the 
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power sharing or democratic board, which usually rejects any kind of dominant 
leadership by an individual; the fragmented board, where there are strong competing 
factions, and the powerless board where the board is unclear about its role and 
responsibilities and there is a lack of commitment. The CEO-dominated board was the 
most common, occurring in just under half the boards, followed quite closely by the 
power-sharing board. However, this research involved a cross-sectional survey and 
does not address how power relations may change over time as circumstances change. 
 
Few studies have focussed directly on the relationship between chairs and CEOs in 
nonprofit organizations. Otto (2003) carried out a comparative study of the role of 
chairs and senior managers in the private, public and nonprofit sectors. Contrary to 
her initial expectations she found that roles in the nonprofit sector were not more 
ambiguous or conflicting, but that nonprofits found it more difficult to resolve these 
ambiguities. She also found chairs of nonprofits were more reluctant to use their 
formal powers, suggesting this may be due to the limited time voluntary chairs were 
able to commit to the role. 
 
Iecovich and Bar-Mor (2007) examined the relative dominance of chairs and CEOs in 
a survey of local nonprofits in Israel. Similar to Murray et al (1992) they found that 
CEO dominance was the most common form of power relation (41% of 
organizations), but chairs were perceived to dominate in 36% of organisations. 
Interestingly they found that the more established the organization the more likely the 
CEO was to dominate. The best predictor of chair dominance was the amount of time 
the chair spent working in the organization, lending support to Otto’s suggestion that 
this is a crucial factor in the degree of influence the chair has. 
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Next we discuss some of main theories that have been used to throw light on the 
relationship between the chair and CEO.  
 
Theoretical perspectives on chair-CEO relations 
 
Agency theory has been the dominant theory used to explain corporate governance 
arrangements in the private sector (Keasey et al, 1997: 3-5). It assumes that the 
owners of an enterprise will have different interests from those that manage it. 
Consequently the main role of the board is to oversee management to ensure it acts in 
the owners’ best interests, and a key role of the chair is to supervise the CEO. In 
contrast stewardship theory assumes that managers and owners share common 
interests and that managers can be trusted to act in the organization’s and owners’ best 
interests (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). The main function of the board is to work with 
management to improve organizational performance. By extension the role of the 
chair is to support and partner the CEO in leading the organization. 
 
Two important criticisms can be made of these theories. It has been suggested that 
they only illuminate a particular aspect of a board’s work (Hung, 1998: 108; Tricker, 
2000: 295). Secondly, the theories identify universal and fixed roles; there is no 
recognition that boards and chairs may play a number of different roles depending on 
the circumstances. 
 
In contrast to agency and stewardship theory, role theory recognises that a person may 
carry out a number of different roles and that roles may change as expectations on the 
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role incumbent change (Biddle, 1986). Understanding the roles and relationships 
between a chair and CEO has to take into account the context i.e. the wider 
relationships and expectations that surround these two top jobs (Roberts and Styles, 
1999: 37). 
 
Stewart (1991) used role theory to help understand the relationship between chairs 
CEOs in various districts of the UK’s National Health Service. She showed that the 
two roles overlap and are dependent on each other.  There was also wide variation in 
the way chairs and CEOs performed their roles that were again partly explained by the 
amount of time the chairs devoted to the job.  
 
While role theory offers an interesting insight into the different roles that chairs may 
play, it does not explain how the relationship between the chair and CEO develops 
over time. The overlapping domains of chair and CEO also suggest that a simple 
division of responsibilities between chairs and CEOs will not be possible, and there 
needs to be some negotiation over who does what. This is likely to be particularly the 
case in small nonprofit organizations, where the boundaries between the board and the 
executive can be very blurred (Rochester, 2003). 
 
In order to better understand the chair-CEO relationship, then, there is need for an 
analytic framework that recognises the negotiated nature of the relationship, and how 
it is influenced by the wider context. Negotiated order theory offers such a possibility. 
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Negotiated order theory 
Negotiated order theory (NOT) was developed by Anselm Strauss and colleagues in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Strauss, 1978). It was a development of social interactionist 
theory, which unlike earlier functionalist theories emphasised social change and the 
dynamic nature of social order (Day and Day, 1977). A key assumption of NOT is 
that ‘… an organization holds together not because of its role structure, but because 
its members consciously or unconsciously construct and reconstruct order, 
continuously negotiating formal and informal arrangements among themselves’ 
(Baïada-Hirèche et al, 2011:19).  
 
NOT has been subject to a number of criticisms (e.g. Benson, 1977; Day and Day, 
1977). Two of the most important are that it purports to provide a complete 
explanation of social order and that it has ignored wider structural factors, such as 
power relations. However, Strauss (1978: 247-259) explicitly refutes these concerns. 
He is at pains to point out that NOT is not a complete theory of social order, and 
argues that negotiation is ‘entwined’ with other processes, such as coercion, 
manipulation, education and persuasion, for ‘getting things done’, and that the 
researcher will need to study these processes together. Importantly NOT explicitly 
recognises how negotiations are shaped by wider structural factors. 
 
NOT can be represented as three concentric circles with negotiation at its heart, 
embedded in the proximate negotiation context, which in turn is embedded in the 
wider structural context (Baïada-Hirèche et al, 2011:19). The negotiation consists of 
‘the interactions and strategies that actors use in the process of mutual adjustment’ 
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(Baïada-Hirèche et al, 2011:19). This may involve sub-processes including making 
trade-offs, paying off debts, compromises and negotiated agreements. The negotiation 
context consists of those ‘structural properties’ that immediately act as ‘conditions’ of 
the negotiation, including the actors, the stakes they have in the negotiation, the 
settings in which they interact, the frequency of their interactions, the power sources 
they can draw upon and the issues that they face (Strauss, 1978: 237-8). The 
structural context consists of the structural properties of the wider social setting in 
which the negotiations take place (Strauss, 1978: 237). It may include organizational, 
economic, social, technological and political conditions, that impact on the other two 
dimensions. The nature of the negotiation context and structural context will vary 
over time and ‘place’ and need to be derived inductively from the field (Baïada-
Hirèche et al, 2011: 19). 
 
In NOT social order is negotiated and re-negotiated through a recursive relationship 
between the structural context, the negotiation context, social interactions and their 
outcomes (Dokko et al., 2012: 686). Unlike contingency theory, which assumes that 
contextual factors have an objective status, NOT recognises that actors actively 
interpret and make sense of their environment and it is the meaning that actors make 
of external events that shapes their actions.  
 
While Strauss’ theory is relatively old it continues to attract interest in a variety of 
fields, including management studies, and has been used, for example, to help 
understand managerial responsibility (e.g Baïada-Hirèche et al, 2011), technological 
innovation (e.g. Dokko et al, 2012), ‘lean’ approaches to organizational improvement 
(Rahbek et al, 2011) and the competing roles of middle managers (Bryant and 
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Stensaker, 2011). More specifically various authors have suggested its potential for 
understanding chair-CEO relations (Roberts and Stiles, 1999; Robinson and 
Exworthy, 1999).  
 
Methodology 
 
The data on which this article draws comes from a longitudinal case study of a small, 
local nonprofit organization – ‘Hawthorn’1 – which provides family support services 
in an English town. It provides weekly two-hour drop-in support sessions at various 
locations across its district. Each session involves a (paid) facilitator, supported by 
one or two volunteers, working with a small group of women and their children, with 
expert input from a range of specialist professionals, such as health visitors. 
 
The case study is part of a larger qualitative, longitudinal programme of research 
examining the fortunes, strategies and challenges faced by a range of nonprofit 
organizations (Macmillan, 2011; Macmillan et al, 2011). At ‘Hawthorn’, the research  
involved 22 semi-structured interviews with 13 different people associated with the 
organisation, including staff and board members, over the period Spring 2010 to 
Summer 2013, supplemented by observations of, for example, project activities, an 
Annual General Meeting, a volunteer coffee morning and an external stakeholder 
open day. Table 1 below provides details of interviewees. In particular, the research 
included four interviews with the new CEO (July 2010, December 2010, September 
2012 and July 2013), three interviews with the Chair (April 2010, September 2011 
and September 2012), and finally one joint interview with both the Chair and CEO 
(July 2013). These are highlighted in the table and form the main basis for the 
analysis presented here. The analysis was informed by the other interviews in the 
 12 
case, and triangulated with observations and analysis of documents, particularly in 
relation to the funding context facing the organisation and how it developed its overall 
strategy. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Due to the longitudinal nature of the study, the precise questions asked in each 
interview were a flexible response to the changing circumstances of the organisation. 
As is characteristic of qualitative longitudinal research, the interviews involve a 
‘temporally chaotic’ (Langley and Stensaker, 2012: 163) combination of current, 
prospective and retrospective reflection. This combination is reflected in our analysis. 
Interviews in wave 1 tended to involve questions designed to understand the recent 
historical background of the organisation; for example, how it was formed and how it 
had developed to date. Interviews in subsequent waves involve more of a reflection on 
developments since the previous wave of research and current pre-occupations.    
 
Analysis of the data was conducted in two stages. In the first stage all the interviews 
were transcribed and subject to initial broad coding. Nvivo software was used to assist 
in the management of a large, complex dataset. Broad codes relevant to this article 
included ‘organisational history’, ‘structure’ and ‘governance and leadership’: the 
latter consisting of material pertaining to boards, trustees, regulation, constitutions, 
roles and expectations of leaders such as officers and senior staff. 
 
In the second stage of analysis we chose not to follow a detailed analytical coding 
approach because there is danger that it can lead to fragmentation and data being 
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considered out of context (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 80; Spencer et al, 2003: 203). 
This is particularly important in longitudinal studies where there is a complex 
interplay between context and organisational processes. Instead we adopted a manual 
approach to data analysis, similar to that described by MacLure (2008: 174), where 
we read and re-read the data, annotated and made notes on transcripts, and brought 
different theories and ideas to bear as we tried to make sense of the data. Our 
approach was informed by Pettigrew’s account of ‘processual analysis’, in which 
attention is drawn to chronology, sequences of action, transition points and critical 
personalities (Pettigrew, 1992: 345). The various theories that have been used to try to 
understand chair – CEO relations outline in the literature review were considered and 
we felt NOT best enabled us structure the analysis and to make sense of data.  
 
Analysis of the case 
 
Hawthorn originated as a volunteer-only group. When the research started, it had been 
in operation for approximately five years, and had an annual income of around 
£50,000. A long-term grant from a foundation alongside a small grant from its local 
council had enabled Hawthorn to expand and employ its first staff, and its founder 
became the organisation’s first paid Co-ordinator/CEO. However, as research 
participation was being discussed, Hawthorn was thrown into crisis. The Co-ordinator 
was dismissed for disciplinary reasons. Within a couple of months a new and 
relatively inexperienced Co-ordinator was appointed, tasked by the board of trustees 
with restoring Hawthorn’s external reputation and developing new internal structures 
and systems. Given the size of the organization, and the fact that the trustees and staff 
had mainly been recruited through the founding co-ordinator, the crisis tested personal 
and professional loyalties. However, the trustee board held together, and the new Co-
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ordinator, supported by the Chair, started implementing new ideas for how Hawthorn 
should be organised and developed.  
 
Over the subsequent 3.5 years the research tracked Hawthorn’s progress in its explicit 
strategy of becoming more formal and professional, in order to provide more services 
and be in a better position to compete for new resources. Our analysis here uses NOT 
to examine how the Chair-CEO relationship evolved through four important phases 
during this period. These phases were derived inductively from the longitudinal data, 
and correspond to distinctive periods in the focal relationship between the Chair and 
CEO. In this we follow the ‘temporal bracketing’ approach suggested by Langley and 
Stensaker (2012: 163), where data is subdivided into phases separated by 
discontinuity, allowing comparison between phases as units of analysis. The analysis 
proceeds from the macro to the micro levels, analysing the structural and negotiation 
contexts before analysing how the relationship between the Chair and CEO was 
negotiated. A summary of the main findings are presented in table 2 and are discussed 
in more detail in the sections below.  
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Phase 1: Growth and the Coordinator Crisis 
 
Structural context 
Hawthorn began as a small voluntary group in 2004 led by its founder Clare. She 
recruits various friends and acquaintances to be the organization’s first board 
members.  Between 2004 and 2008 Hawthorn grows very slowly by obtaining small 
grants, but in 2008 a large foundation grant enables it to expand its operations and to 
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employ Clare as a Coordinator and other staff to run sessions for its client group. The 
new funding shields the organization from the effects of the financial crisis that began 
in 2008, and the subsequent austerity measures and cut-backs in public services. 
 
A consequence of the new funding is that the Coordinator and the board recognise 
that the organization needs to become more business-like now they are managing an 
increased budget and paid staff. As a result a new Chair for the governing body is 
sought to bring this necessary experience and expertise to the organization. 
 
Negotiation context 
Clare uses her contacts to recruit the new Chair, David. He has considerable 
experience in the governance of housing associations. He is also a local parish 
councillor, well known and well-connected politically. As one staff member observes, 
his recruitment, in Autumn 2008, marks the beginning of an important transition for 
the organization: 
 
‘…We had … two previous chairs but they weren’t aware of the chair role, … 
but after the [grant] came in … it became a business and getting a new chair 
… he’s brought it into a business…’ 
 
However, the new Chair has a shock after joining the board, when he finds the 
organization is in a worse state than he had assumed: 
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‘I was led to believe that [it] was … a very good organization with policies, 
procedures and … internal controls, and within two months I saw the real 
picture … it … had no internal controls, very few policies, procedures,…’ 
  
The organization has a very informal culture. For example, the Chair comments on 
trustees’ meetings: ‘There were verbal updates and the minutes of the meetings were 
very kind of sketchy which didn’t really capture anything.’ As a result he sets about 
trying to professionalise the organization by introducing a more formal approach. This 
sets the context for the evolving relationship between the Chair and the Coordinator.   
 
Negotiations  
The new Chair seeks to change relationships between himself, the board and the 
Coordinator. In particular he tries to establish a line management relationship with the 
Coordinator, but this is resisted. The Chair observes: 
 
‘…when I started doing my initial one to one meetings with Clare I … 
introduced … some smart targets into a work plan, which for the first 
probably 6 months Clare resisted that kind of approach and it was quite a 
struggle and there was lots of discussions around that we weren’t really big 
enough to have written reports to Trustees. But then very quickly it became 
very clear that the verbal updates were just a smokescreen to very poor 
performance …’ 
 
The Chair is so concerned about the state of the organization that he commissions 
outside consultants to carry out an audit of Hawthorn’s systems and procedures to see 
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if his views are supported. This appears to be tactical. He is aware that trustees are 
friends of the Coordinator and that his views might not be supported without external 
validation. Again the Coordinator resists this process, as one staff member observes: 
 
‘I’ve always been answerable to somebody, but Clare never was … the 
information holding got worse and worse... And it turned out to be this power 
struggle…’  
 
The audit report confirms the Chair’s concerns and sets out an action plan to improve 
performance management and accountability in the organization. The trustees are 
frustrated by the failure of the Coordinator to provide information, and there is a 
growing sense of distrust. Subsequently, the Coordinator is suspended and then 
dismissed for an unrelated disciplinary matter after an investigation by the trustees. 
 
As Strauss notes negotiations are often entwined with other processes such as the 
exercise of power, persuasion and manipulation. The relationship between Chair and 
the Coordinator could not be satisfactorily resolved by just negotiation and 
persuasion, but resulted in a power struggle with the Chair and the board having to 
use their formal authority to try to resolve the situation, and then, when a disciplinary 
matter is discovered, to dismiss the Coordinator. 
 
Phase 2: Transition and appointment of new Coordinator 
 
Structural context 
A new phase begins with the dismissal of the founding Coordinator in Spring 2010. 
During this period the funding for the organization is still secure but the main grant is 
 18 
due to end in 2013. Discussions are held with Hawthorn’s funders to explain the 
situation regarding the audit and previous Coordinator and agree a new set of key 
performance indicators (KPIs). 
 
Negotiation context 
The Chair is aware the organization needs to be in the position to bid for further 
funding before the current grant ends. In the absence of a coordinator the Chair, 
supported by trustees, effectively acts as the manager of the organization. Other staff 
take on increased hours and responsibilities. The crisis over the Coordinator and the 
recruitment of a replacement, Ellie, also requires the board to take a more proactive 
role, which helps it to gel and work together more effectively. As one board member 
observes: 
 
‘… the trustees had a lot of input into getting another coordinator …, and I 
think that’s what it made it work a lot better; because we all came together… 
so I think Ellie knew where she stood from the beginning ...  It was like her 
working for us and not us working for them ...’ 
 
Ellie is young and has relatively little managerial experience. The Chair takes a risk in 
arguing for her appointment, against the views of some other panel members, who 
thought she was too inexperienced. 
  
Negotiations 
Given the relative inexperience of the Coordinator the Chair takes on a line 
management and mentoring role with her, with regular meetings and contact. She sees 
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the Chair as acting as her boss in the first few months of the job, but gradually this 
relationship begins to change to a position where she feels can have more input or 
disagree with him: 
 
‘The first four or five months was very much whatever David says goes, and 
he’s the big boss, whereas even now I’m learning that some things I can 
disagree with him on …’  
 
Initially Ellie feels that the legacy of the previous Coordinator means that the board is 
less willing to trust her, but gradually this changes as she is seen to be doing a good 
job.  
  
The first year of Ellie’s role as Coordinator involves working to restore Hawthorn’s 
internal operations and external reputation. Ellie and David develop a strong working 
relationship. Ellie consciously attends to internal procedures, for example for 
managing volunteers. In addition Ellie and David implement a rethink of the way 
services are organized, including a rebranding exercise to demonstrate Hawthorn’s 
new professional image. Ellie comments on how she and David developed the idea, 
which reflects a change in the relationship to one based more on partnership: 
 
‘we were having this kind of idea thing of where we could take Hawthorn and 
what it could do…once he had gone, I thought, “right, okay, I’ll develop this 
journey”... We have kind of an idea sharing conversation, then I’ll put that on 
paper really, and then we’ll look at it again…’ 
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Phase 3: Further Consolidation and internal conflict 
 
Structural context 
The local authority is moving towards commissioning contracts for family services. 
The security of national funding for these services is also reduced and a local targeted 
source of funding is to be abolished. The Chair, through his extensive networks, has 
anticipated these developments, and this informs his efforts to professionalise 
Hawthorn to be in a position to compete for contracts.  
 
The new service structure in Hawthorn is in place and services have expanded. From 
interviews with external stakeholders, it appears that the more professional approach 
and image has been well received.  
 
Negotiation context 
The Coordinator is primarily office bound, away from the various locations where the 
drop-in sessions are held. Her emphasis is on improving the administration of the 
organization and putting new policies and procedures in place. As a result the Chair 
considers that she has become somewhat isolated from the rest of the team and 
activities: ‘…she’s too office based and she’s not really engaging with the service 
users…’. 
 
During this time tensions emerge among the staff team. The Chair comments: 
 
‘… it appears that the team’s split…. It’s not healthy, they don’t seem to work 
together particularly well at the moment…’ 
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In part the split is exacerbated by the return from maternity leave of a long-standing 
staff member. She is unhappy with the changes the organization has made and fears it 
is losing its original ethos. The Chair is concerned that Ellie has not adequately 
addressed the situation, he observes: 
 
‘when the staff meetings take place there’s almost like two camps…I think 
Ellie’s lack of experience hasn’t been able to manage that process.’ 
 
Negotiations 
This conflict makes the Chair reassess the Coordinator’s strengths and weaknesses 
and his relationship with her, and her relationship with the team. He observes: 
 
‘…we are … looking for some mentoring for Ellie around people management, 
… Because the paperwork side is exceptional…but we need the whole 
package’  
 
The Chair is also concerned about the boundary between his and the Coordinator’s 
roles, and whether he is getting too involved in management: 
 
‘…it’s so difficult to not get sucked in and actually do the job for Ellie …, but 
then if I started getting involved in line managing her staff, one, it’s not 
beneficial to Ellie and two, I might as well apply for Ellie’s job.’ 
 
His concerns are reflected by another staff member who comments:  
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‘I do feel that David is running Hawthorn, and Ellie’s just David’s puppet.’ 
 
The Chair recognizes he needs to move from a mentoring role to more of a line 
management role and negotiates with the Coordinator to get an outside person to 
undertake the mentoring role.  
 
Phase 4: A new crisis and critical incidents 
 
Structural context 
After a period of relative calm and consolidation, a move of premises and concerns 
over long-term funding dominate issues affecting the organization. The new building 
has the advantage of consolidating the staff in one place, but requires some 
refurbishing.  
 
A further bid to the foundation to give continuation funding is submitted, but is 
unsuccessful. This is a significant blow to morale. The organization is tendering for a 
local authority contract to deliver services for the first time. 
 
Negotiation context 
The move to a new building and the funding situation creates new issues that have to 
be dealt with by the Chair and Coordinator. The Chair feels a sense of continuing 
crises that require a high level of involvement with difficult decisions about where to 
focus his attention:  
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‘As soon as we get quite level, we then decide to come and move to a building 
like this, … that then needs quite a lot of support. Even getting this place 
painted and stuff like that. … Ellie’s still... got quite a lot of development …, 
which takes a lot of time … and then trying to strengthen the trustee Board 
and encouraging some of the trustees to get more involved. All I do is move my 
attention somewhere else…’ 
 
In addition longer-term funding issues are becoming more pressing. This crystallises 
when the new bid to the foundation is rejected. The Chair comments: 
 
‘… we had a letter from the [foundation] saying that we weren’t successful … 
which has really kicked the organization, … And then supporting Ellie 
through that, … what our next plans are, …? It’s another drain on my 
resources …’ 
 
At the same time the Chair wants to step back from his role as Chair, but the 
organization is finding it difficult to find a replacement and he feels pressure to stay 
on: 
  
‘I made it very clear … that I would resign from the Chair position at this 
AGM…. But … everybody’s, you know, “I want you to stay”’ 
 
Negotiations 
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The Chair tries to negotiate a less involved relationship with the organization and 
Coordinator. However, he feels compelled to give more time when challenges arise, 
such as the move to the new building and the failure of the grant application:  
 
‘Ellie was very much in the seat, running the show.  But I got more involved 
again when we moved here and I’ve just about started to back off and then the 
[grant decision]... this week’s peaked it again.  Ellie just needs that support... 
As soon as we get a strategy agreed then she’s clear again, she’ll be off 
again.’  
 
The Chair also feels he has to support the Coordinator when she has to bid for a 
tender with the local authority as she has not done this before, and worries about what 
will happen to Hawthorn if this is not successful. 
 
During this period the Chair and Coordinator are still negotiating their relationship 
and how the Chair can best offer support, as highlighted here by the Coordinator: 
 
‘he always says to me “you need to tell me what I need to do or where I need 
to go if I’m… stepping on your toes.” …it’s probably going to take us another 
six months to get it right, how we work together.”  
 
Both had done a Myers-Briggs
2
 psychometric profile and were discussing the 
implications for how they work together:  
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‘… one of the things that’s come out is that Ellie’s  ... an ideas person. So, my 
view is … why aren’t you sharing them?  Am I a barrier to that?’ 
 
The Coordinator reflects similarly: 
 
‘it was really helpful, …  he gets very wound up with me because he says I 
don’t communicate, I make all the decisions in my head and then I just go and 
do it.  … that’s true, but I think it’s having a sit down and actually think that’s 
just my personality … if you give me time to talk and time to share things I 
will.’ 
 
Looking back, from the vantage point of 2012, on how her relationship with the Chair 
has changed since she started in 2010, Ellie suggests the emergence over time of a 
more equal relationship: 
 
‘… to start with I think he was … very intimidating… it took me…a good six 
months to get comfortable in the organization …  I’ve continued to grow and I 
think… he’s started to, you know, respect me and trust me …. He still 
definitely will challenge me on things and it’s only now after kind of two and a 
half years that I’m starting to think right, okay, I could challenge him back. ... 
There hasn’t been many times that we’ve had a different view… but I’m 
definitely more confident to do that now.’   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
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Research on the relationship between boards and staff in nonprofit organizations has 
tended to characterise the relationship in terms of roles and power. The most prevalent 
pattern observed is the CEO-dominated board, but other patterns including the chair-
dominated board are also common. More specifically the research on chair-CEO 
relationship has characterised it in terms of relatively stable role descriptions. With a 
few exceptions these studies take little or no account of how context may shape these 
relationships. This research challenges these views. It provides clear evidence of the 
dynamic and contextually embedded nature of the chair-CEO relationship. It shows 
that the relationship between the chair and CEO cannot be fully captured in terms of 
stable power differences or role descriptions and that the boundary between what the 
chair and CEO do is subject to renegotiation and change as the relationship develops 
and in the light of changing circumstances. 
 
Negotiated order theory suggests that negotiations are recursively embedded in wider 
structural factors such as power relations. Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) argue 
that board members and executives are able to draw on a variety of structural power 
sources such as position, expertise, access to information, and relationships with other 
key actors. However, they suggest that it is not just access to these structural sources 
of power that determines influence, but ‘will’ and ‘skill’ in using power sources, and 
that different contextual conditions can be more or less favourable to the exercise of 
power and authority. The case study suggests that differences in power sources 
between the Chair and the two Coordinators (CEOs) and will and skill in using these 
sources of power in a contextually relevant way were important in shaping the 
interactions between them and how the relationship develops. In addition the case 
suggests that having time is also crucial to the exercise of power. The Chair not only 
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had the will and skill to use various sources of power, but was able to devote the 
necessary time to do so.  
 
With respect to the second Coordinator, the Chair’s established position, the fact that 
he had essentially been acting as CEO after the first Coordinator left the organization, 
as well as his formal position as chair and good relations with board members put him 
in a strong position of authority with respect to the new Coordinator. This was 
reinforced by the relatively large difference in age and experience between the two.  
At this stage in the relationship the Chair was able to commit considerable time to his 
voluntary role. This enabled him to adopt both a line management and mentoring role 
with respect to the new Coordinator, who, at least initially, felt somewhat in awe of 
him. 
 
The Chair’s relationship with the first Coordinator highlights how differences in the 
negotiation context can influence how the relationship is negotiated. In this instance it 
was the Chair who was new and the Coordinator who was established and had close 
personal links with the board. Although the Chair was recruited in order to make the 
organization more business-like, the Coordinator felt able to resist the Chair’s 
attempts to establish clearer lines of accountability and more formal systems and 
procedures. Because the Chair was unsure of his authority and his degree of influence 
in the board he felt he had to commission an external audit to verify his view of the 
problematic state of the organisation. This negotiation tactic was important in gaining 
the board’s support, and in reinforcing his position with the Coordinator. It also 
helped to cement his authority within the organization. 
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The literature highlights the important role of trust and mutual respect if a positive 
relationship is to develop between a chair and CEO and how both virtuous and vicious 
circles can occur if trust builds or breaks down (Roberts and Styles, 1999; 
Sundamurthy and Lewis, 2003). The first Coordinator’s resistance to change and 
withholding of information led to a deterioration of trust and the eventual breakdown 
of the relationship with the Chair and ultimately the board.  As the second 
Coordinator gained confidence and experience, she and the Chair were able to 
establish a close working relationship which enabled mutual trust and respect to 
develop. Interestingly the two were conscious of the need to work together well and 
were able to reflect on and renegotiate their respective roles as circumstances 
changed. For the Chair there was a tension between how much control and support to 
exercise with respect to the Coordinator. On the one hand he did not want to 
undermine the Coordinator, but on the other hand he felt compelled to intervene when 
he felt she did not have the skills or expertise to deal with specific situations. 
 
However, the gradual change in the relationship was not a linear process, and the 
research highlights some of the important contextual events that affected short-term 
changes in the relationship. NOT highlights the recursive relationship between the 
negotiation and wider structural context. An important source of the Chair’s power 
was his ability to make sense of changes in the organization’s external environment, 
particularly around funding, and then develop a compelling narrative about how the 
organization needed to respond if it was to meet the requirements of funders and 
acquire new funding in the future. This is particularly important in small voluntary 
organizations like Hawthorn that are dependent on one or two key funders and hence 
very vulnerable to changes in their priorities. 
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As various authors have noted, boards in both the private and nonprofit sectors are 
more likely to become proactive when their organization faces a crisis (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989; Wood, 1992; Mordaunt and Cornforth, 2004). Similarly, in this case 
crises were important in triggering the Chair to intervene and take a more managerial 
role himself. Sometimes these crises stemmed from within the organization, for 
example when there were tensions among the staff group the Chair intervened directly 
and organised a meeting with staff to try to resolve the issue. Sometimes crises 
stemmed from outside the organization, for example when its continuation grant bid 
failed. Again the Chair stepped in to work with the Coordinator in the pursuit of new 
funding. Other changes in the wider structural context were also important in 
influencing the relationship. The Chair’s drive to professionalise the organization was 
a proactive response both to meet the monitoring requirements of existing funders, 
and to build the systems and external reputation of the organization to prepare it for 
bidding for contracts with the local authority.  
 
The research also throws further light on what Rochester (2003) has called the 
liability of smallness. He notes that in small organizations it is more difficult to 
differentiate between the role of the board and the role of staff than in larger 
organizations as the staff often do not have all the skills or time needed to run the 
organization and so board members often take on more operational roles. Similarly, in 
this case the boundary between the roles of the Chair and Coordinator was more of a 
blurred and shifting zone as the Chair felt it necessary to compensate for the 
Coordinator lack of experience or skills. This created certain dilemmas for the Chair. 
He was aware of the dangers of intervening too much and undermining the 
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Coordinator, but at the same time was aware of certain skill gaps, including 
strategically anticipating developments in the external context. He was also aware of 
the pressure on his own time and wanted to step back from the role, but often felt he 
could not. These tensions and challenges can make the position of chair in small 
nonprofit organizations particularly demanding. 
 
An important limitation of case study method is the ability to generalise in a statistical 
sense. As previous research has revealed relationships between chairs and CEOs are 
likely to differ in other contexts. However, in-depth longitudinal case studies do have 
the potential to reveal underlying causal processes and to develop theoretical 
generalisations (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Tsang, 2013). The research 
demonstrates that NOT, when combined with an understanding of power relations in 
and around boardrooms, provides valuable conceptual tools for helping to understand 
not only how but why the relationship between Chair and CEO/Coordinator changed 
over time. It has shown that the negotiation of the relationship is influenced by the 
relative differences in experience, skill, the extent to which each had established a 
position of authority in the organization, and the will, skill and time necessary to use 
these power sources. It also demonstrated how changes in the relationship were often 
triggered by wider contextual changes. In particular perceived crises triggered by 
either external events, such as the failure of the funding bid, or internal events such as 
the conflict between the staff, which caused the Chair to take a more pro-active and 
executive role. An important part of the Chair’s power stemmed from his perceived 
ability to make sense of these contextual changes and present compelling way of 
addressing them. Establishing mutual trust and respect were also important in 
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developing a successful working relationship; when trust begins to break down there 
is a danger the relationship can enter a downward spiral. 
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Notes 
 
1. ‘Hawthorn’ is a pseudonym designed to provide case anonymity, and all names of 
respondents have been changed. 
2. Myers-Briggs is a psychometric test to assess psychological preferences and is 
often used to help with personal development and group dynamics. 
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Table 1: Participants interviewed during the research 
Wave Date Role Interview 
1 22/04/10 Project Manager 1st 
1 22/04/10 Chair (‘David’) 1st 
1 14/07/10 New Coordinator (‘Ellie’) 1st 
2 07/12/10 Administrator 1st 
2 07/12/10 New Coordinator (‘Ellie’) 2nd 
2 07/03/11 CEO of local development organisation 1st 
2 07/03/11 Board advisor/Development Manager of local 
development organisation 
1st 
2 16/03/11 Board member/CEO of local peer voluntary 
organisation 
1st 
2 17/03/11 Coordinator of similar statutory project 1st 
3 30/08/11 Project Manager 2nd 
3 09/09/11 Chair (‘David’) 2nd 
3 09/09/11 Board member/local statutory partnership 
manager 
1st 
3 19/09/11 Treasurer 1st 
4 14/08/12 Board advisor/Development Manager of local 
development organisation 
2nd 
4 30/08/12 Board member of local peer voluntary 
organisation 
1st 
4 30/08/12 Coordinator of similar statutory project 2nd 
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4 05/09/12 Project Manager 1st 
4 05/09/12 Chair (‘David’) 3rd 
4 05/09/12 New Coordinator (‘Ellie’) 3rd 
4 04/10/12 Commissioner – local statutory organisation 1st 
5 24/07/13 New Coordinator (‘Ellie’) 4th 
5 24/07/13 Chair (‘David’)/New Coordinator (‘Ellie’) - joint 4/5th 
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Table 2: A summary of the analysis of the case 
Negotiations in 
context 
Growth and the 
coordinator crisis (2004-
2010) 
Transition and 
appointment of new 
coordinator (2010-2011) 
Further consolidation 
and internal conflict 
(2011-2012) 
A new crisis and critical 
incidents (2012-2013) 
Structural 
context: 
-organizational 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organization starts as 
small volunteer group. 
Friends and acquaintances 
‘recruited’ by the founder 
to the board. New funding 
enables expansion of 
services. Founder becomes 
paid coordinator.  
 
 
In the absence of a 
Coordinator the Chair 
takes on a much more pro-
active role.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A new service structure is 
in place and services have 
expanded. The new 
approach (and image) 
seems to have been well 
received.  
 
 
 
 
After a period of relative 
calm a move of premises 
and concerns over long 
term funding dominate 
issues affecting the 
organization.  
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-financial/ 
economic 
 
 
 
- political 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding provides 
insulation from effects of 
wider financial context. 
 
 
Political shift in local 
authority, which may have 
implications for future 
funding. 
 
 
Funding secure until 2013.  
 
 
The local authority is 
moving towards 
outsourcing services and a 
ring fence on national 
funding has been removed. 
A local targeted source of 
funding is to be abolished.  
 
 
 
A funding bid is 
unsuccessful and the 
organization is in the 
position of having to 
tender for a local authority 
contract for the first time. 
Negotiation 
context: 
- settings 
- key actors, 
 
 
New Chair concerned over 
state of the organization, 
 
 
Trustees become more 
involved during the crisis 
 
 
Chair concerned about 
emerging funding 
 
 
The move to a new 
building creates practical 
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interests and 
expectations 
 
e.g. the lack of systems 
and procedures. 
Coordinator happy with 
informal way of working. 
and in appointing a new 
relatively inexperienced 
coordinator. 
 
Chair clear that 
organization needs to be in 
a good position to bid for 
further funding when 
current funding ends. 
 
environment and wants 
organization to 
professionalise to be in 
position to bid for 
contracts when current 
funding ends. 
 
The new Coordinator is 
primarily office bound and 
potentially isolated from 
the rest of the team and 
activities. 
 
Divisions emerge in the 
staff team.  
challenges. 
 
Chair concerned about 
possible funding crisis 
given failed funding bid. 
At the same time the Chair 
would like to step back 
from his role, but is 
finding this difficult.  
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‘Negotiations’ 
 
Very different styles of 
Chair and Coordinator 
lead to tensions.  
 
Chair deploys outside 
consultants to review 
organization. 
  
Coordinator resists the 
process. Leads to further 
distrust between Chair and 
Coordinator. 
 
Disciplinary investigation 
of the Coordinator, who is 
Chair takes on line 
management and 
mentoring role for new 
Coordinator, who sees 
Chair as ‘guiding’ what 
she does. 
 
New Coordinator feels 
Chair trusts her more than 
the rest of the trustee 
board. Gradually trust is 
rebuilt. 
 
After 4-5 months 
Coordinator feels more 
Chair concerned by team 
conflict and Coordinator’s 
isolation from staff. 
 
Chair recognizes need to 
move to more of a line 
management role and 
organises an outside 
mentor. Chair concerned 
about getting too sucked 
into a management role. 
Chair tries to negotiate a 
less involved governance 
relationship with the 
organization and 
Coordinator. However, he 
feels compelled to give 
more time when funding 
crises or problems occur. 
 
Chair and Coordinator still 
working on their 
relationship and discussing 
how the Chair can best 
offer support.  
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suspended and then asked 
to leave. 
 
confident to disagree with 
the Chair. 
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